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Despite the obvious advantage of simple life forms capable of fast replication, different levels
of cognitive complexity have been achieved by living systems in terms of their potential to cope
with environmental uncertainty. Against the inevitable cost associated to detecting environmental
cues and responding to them in adaptive ways, we conjecture that the potential for predicting the
environment can overcome the expenses associated to maintaining costly, complex structures. We
present a minimal formal model grounded in information theory and selection, in which successive
generations of agents are mapped into transmitters and receivers of a coded message. Our agents
are guessing machines and their capacity to deal with environments of different complexity defines
the conditions to sustain more complex agents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Simple life forms dominate our biosphere (Gould, 2011)
and define a lower bound of embodied, self-replicating
systems. But life displays an enormously broad range of
complexity levels, affecting many different traits of living
entities, from their body size to their cognitive abilities
(Bonner, 1988). This creates somewhat a paradox: if
larger, more complex organisms are more costly to grow
and maintain, why is not all life single-celled? Several ar-
guments help provide a rationale for the emergence and
persistence of complex life forms. As an instance Gould
(2011) proposes that complexity is not a trait explicitly
favored by evolution. A review of fossil records con-
vinces Gould that, across genera, phyla, and the whole
biosphere, we observe the expected random fluctuations
around the more successful adaptation to life. In this big
picture, bacteria are the leading life form and the com-
plexity of every other living system is the product of a
random drift. Complex life would never be explicitly fa-
vored, but a complexity wall exists right below bacteria:
simpler forms fail to subsist. Hence, a random fluctua-
tion is more likely to produce more complex forms, falsely
suggesting that evolution promotes complexity.
Major innovations in evolution involve the appearance
of new types of agents displaying cooperation while lim-
iting conflict (Maynard-Smith & Szathma´ry, 1997; Sza-
thma´ry & Maynard-Smith, 1997). A specially important
innovation involved the rise of cognitive agents, namely
those capable of sensing their environments and reacting
to their changes in a highly adaptable way (Jablonka &
Lamb, 2006). These agents were capable of dealing with
more complex, non-genetic forms of information. The ad-
vantages of such cognitive complexity become clear when
considering their potential to better predict the environ-
ment, thus reducing the average hazards of unexpected
fluctuations. As pointed by Francois Jacob, an organ-
ism is “a sort of machine for predicting the future – an
automatic forecasting apparatus” (Friston, 2013; Jacob,
1998; Wagensberg, 2000). The main message is that fore-
seeing the future is a crucial ability to cope with un-
certainty. If the advantages of prediction overcome the
problem of maintaining and replicating the costly struc-
tures needed for inference, more complex information-
processing mechanisms might be favored under the ap-
propriate circumstances.
Here we aim at providing a minimal model that cap-
tures these tradeoffs. In doing so, we characterize thor-
oughly an evolutionary driver that can push towards ev-
ermore complex life forms. We adopt an information the-
ory perspective in which agents are inference devices in-
teracting with a Boolean environment. For convenience,
this environment is represented by a tape with ones and
zeros, akin to non-empty inputs of a Turing machine (fig-
ure 1a). The agent G locates itself in a given position and
tries to predict each bit of a given sequence of length n –
hence it is dubbed an n-guesser. Each attempt to predict
a bit involves some cost c, while a reward r is received
for each successful prediction. 1-guessers are simple and
assume that all bits are uncorrelated, while (n > 1)-
guessers find correlations and can get a larger benefit
if some structure happens to be present in the environ-
ment. A whole n-bit prediction cycle can be described as
a program (figure 1b). A survival function ρ depends on
the number of attempts to guess bits and the number of
correct predictions. Successful guessers have a positive
balance between reward and prediction cost. They get
replicated and pass on their inference abilities. Other-
wise, the agent fails to replicate and eventually dies.
As a simple illustration of our approach, consider a 1-
guesser living in an infinitely large environment E where
uncorrelated bits take value 0 with probability p and 1
with probability 1 − p. The average performance of a
guesser G when trying to infer bits from E is given by
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FIG. 1 Predictive agents and environmental complexity. a An agent G interacts with an external environment E that
is modeled as a string of random bits. These bits take value 0 with probability p and value 1 otherwise. The agent tries to
guess a sequence of n bits at some cost, with a reward bestowed for each correctly guessed bit. The persistence and replication
of the agent can only be granted if the balance between reward and cost is positive (ρGE > 0). b For a machine attempting
to guess n bits, an algorithmic description of its behavior is shown as a flow graph. Each loop in the computation involves
scanning a random subset of the environment B = (b1, ..., bn) ⊂ E by comparing each bi ∈ B to a proposed guess wi. c A mean
field approach to a certain kind of 1-guesser (modeled in the text through equations 1, 2, and 3) in environments of infinite size
renders a boundary between survival (ρGE > 0) and death (ρ
G
E < 0) as a function of the cost-reward ratio (α) and of relevant
parameters for the 1-guesser model (p in this case). Note that for α < 0.5 every 1-guesser survives for free.
p¯GE , the likelihood of emitting a correct guess:
p¯GE = p
G(0)p+ pG(1)(1− p), (1)
where pG(k) is the frequency with which the guesser
emits the bit value k ∈ {0, 1}. A strategy that uses
pG(0) = p, pG(1) = 1− p (i.e. a guesser that mimics the
environment) makes on average
p¯GE = 2p
2 − 2p+ 1 (2)
successful predictions. Its survival function reads:
ρGE = (2p
2 − 2p+ 1)r − c. (3)
This curve trivially dictates the average survival or ex-
tinction of 1-guessers as a function of the cost-reward
ratio α ≡ c/r. Note that any more complex guesser (like
the ones described below) would always fare worst in this
case: they would potentially pay a larger cost to infer
some structure where none is to be found. Note also that
the tunable parameter α codes for the severity of the
environment.
The idea of autonomy and the fact that predicting
the future implies performing some sort of computation
suggests that a parsimonious theory of life’s complexity
needs to incorporate reproducing individuals (and even-
tually populations) and information (they must be capa-
ble of predicting future environmental states). These two
components define a conflict and an evolutionary trade-
off. Being too simple means that the external world is
perceived as a source of noise. Unexpected fluctuations
can be harmful and useful structure cannot be harnessed
in your benefit. Becoming more complex (hence able
to infer larger structures, if they exist) implies a risk
of not being able to gather enough energy to support
and replicate the mechanisms for inference. As will be
shown below, it is possible to derive the critical condi-
tions to survive as a function of the agent’s complexity
and to connect these conditions to information theory.
As advanced above, this allows us to characterize math-
ematically a scenario in which a guesser’s complexity is
explicitly selected for.
II. EVOLUTION AND INFORMATION THEORY
Key aspects of information theory relate deeply to for-
mulations in statistical physics (Jaynes, 1957a,b; Par-
rondo et al., 2015) and there have been several calls
to further integrate information theory in biological re-
search (Joyce, 2002, 2012; Krakauer, 2011; Maynard-
Smith, 2000; Nurse, 2008; Walker & Davies, 2012). This
theory shall play important roles in population or ecosys-
tems dynamics, in regulatory genomics, and in chemical
signal processing among others (Adami, 2012; Bergstrom
& Lachmann, 2004; Dall et al., 2005; Dall & Johnstone,
2002; Donaldson-Matasci et al., 2010; Donalson-Matasci
et al., 2008; Evans et al., 2015; Friston, 2013; Hidalgo et
al., 2014; Kussell & Leibler, 2005; Marzen & DeDeo, 2016;
McNamara & Houston, 1987; Rivoire & Leibler, 2011;
Sartori et al., 2014; Segre´ et al., 2000, 2001; Szathma´ry,
1989; Tkacˇik & Bialek, 2014), but a unifying approach
is far from complete. Given its generality and power,
information theory has also been used to address prob-
lems that connect Darwinian evolution and far from equi-
librium thermodynamics (Drossel, 2001; England, 2013;
Goldenfeld & Woese, 2010; Nicolis & Prigogine, 1977; Pe-
runov et al., 2014). In its original formulation, Shannon’s
3information theory (Shannon, 1948; Shannon & Weaver,
1949) considers symbols being conveyed from a transmit-
ter to a receiver through a channel. Shannon only deals
with the efficiency of the channel (related to its noise or
reliability) and the entropy of the source. This theory
ignores the content of the emitted symbols, despite the
limitations of such an assumption (Corominas-Murtra et
al., 2014; Maynard-Smith, 2000).
A satisfactory connection between natural selection
and information theory can be obtained by mapping our
survival function ρ into Shannon’s transmitter-receiver
scheme. To do so we consider replicators at an arbitrary
generation T attempting to “send” a message to (i.e. get-
ting replicated into) a later generation T + 1. Hence,
the older generation acts as a transmitter, the newer one
becomes a receiver, and the environment and its con-
tingencies constitute the channel through which the em-
bodied message must be conveyed (figure 2a). From a
more biological perspective, we can think of a genotype
as a generative model (the instructions in an algorithm)
that produces a message that must be transmitted. That
message would be embodied by a phenotype and it in-
cludes every physical process and structure dictated by
the generative model. As discussed by von Neumann &
Burks (1966), any replicating machine must pass on a
physically embodied copy of its instructions – hence the
phenotype must also include a physical realization of the
algorithm encoded by the genotype1. Finally, any evo-
lutionary pressure (including the interaction with other
replicating signals) can be included as contrivances of the
channel.
Following a similar idea of messages being passed from
one generation to the next one, Maynard-Smith (2000)
proposes that the replicated genetic message carries
meaningful information that must be protected against
the channel contingencies. Let us instead depart from a
replicating message devoid of meaning. We realize that
the channel itself would convey more reliably those mes-
sages embodied by a phenotype that better deals with the
environmental (i.e. channel) conditions. Dysfunctional
messages are removed due to natural selection. Efficient
signals get more space in successive generations (figure
2b). Through this process meaningful bits of environ-
mental information are pumped into the replicating sig-
nals, such that the information in future messages will
anticipate those channel contingencies. In our picture,
meaningful information is not protected against the chan-
nel conditions (including noise), but emerges naturally
from them.
1 Note that many of the phenotypic structures built in order to
get replicated are later dismissed (think, e.g., about the germ vs.
somatic cell lines). We present a clear division between genotype
and phenotype for sake of illustration. We are aware of the murky
frontier between these concepts.
FIG. 2 Information and evolution through natural se-
lection. a The propagation of a successful replicator can be
understood in terms of a Shannon-like transmission process
from one generation to the next in which older generations
play the role of a transmitter, younger generations that of a
receiver, and the environment constitutes a noisy channel. b
A simple diagram of the underlying evolution of a popula-
tion of bit guessers. The survival and replication of a given
agent G is indicated by branching whereas failure to survive
is indicated with an empty circle as and endpoint.
A. Messages, channels, and bit guessers
Let us first introduce our implementation of environ-
ments (channels), messages, and the replicating agents.
The later will be dubbed bit-guessers because efficient
transmission will be equivalent to accurately predicting
channel conditions – i.e. to correctly guessing as many
bits about the environment as possible. The notation
that follows may seem arid, so it is good to retain a cen-
tral picture (figure 3): Guessers G posses a generative
model ΓG that must produce messages that fare well in
an environment E. Both these messages and the envi-
ronments are modeled as strings of bits. What follows
is a rigorous mathematical characterization of how the
different bit sequences are produced.
Let us consider m-environments, strings made up of
m sorted random bits. We might consider one single
such m-environment – i.e. one realization E of m sorted
random bits (ei ∈ E, i = 1, . . . ,m; ei ∈ {0, 1}). Al-
ternatively, we might work with the ensemble Em of all
m-environments – i.e. all possible environments of the
same size (ei,l ∈ El, i = 1, . . . ,m; where El ∈ Em,
l = 1, . . . , 2m) – or we might work with a sample Eˆm
of this ensemble (El ∈ Eˆm, l = 1, . . . , ||Eˆm||; where
Eˆm ⊂ Em). We might evaluate the performance of our
bit guessers in single m-environments, in a whole ensem-
4ble, or in a sample of it.
These m-environments model the channels of our
information theory approach. Attempting to transmit
a message through this channel will be implemented
by trying to guess n-sized words from within the
corresponding m-environment. More precisely, given
an n-bit message W (with n < m) which an agent
tries to transmit, we extract an n-sized word (B ⊂ E)
from the corresponding m-environment. Therefore,
we choose a bit at a random position in E and the
successive n − 1 bits. These make up the bi ∈ B, which
are compared to the wi ∈ W . Each wi is successfully
transmitted through the channel if wi = bi. Hence
attempting to transmit messages effectively becomes
an inference task: if a guesser can anticipate the bits
that follow, it has a greater chance of sending messages
through. Messages transmitted equal bits copied into a
later generation, hence increasing the fitness of the agent.
In this paper we allow bit-guessers a minimal ability
to react to the environment. Hence, instead of attempt-
ing to transmit a fixed word W , they are endowed with
a generative model ΓG. This mechanism (explained be-
low) builds the message W as a function of the broadcast
history:
wi = wi(w1, . . . , wi−1; b1, . . . , bi−1).
Hence, the fitness of a generative model is rather based on
the ensemble of messages that it can produce2. To eval-
uate this, our guessers attempt to transmit n-bit words
many (Ng) times through a same channel. For each one
of these broadcasts, a new n-sized word Bj ⊂ E (with
bji ∈ Bj for j = 1, . . . , Ng and i = 1, . . . , n) is extracted
from the same m-environment; and the corresponding
W j are generated, each based on the broadcast history
as dictated by the generative model (see below).
We can calculate different frequencies with which the
guessers or the environments present bits with value
k, k′ ∈ {0, 1}:
pG(k; i) =
1
Ng
Ng∑
j=1
δ(wji , k), (4)
pE(k
′; i) =
1
Ng
Ng∑
j=1
δ(bji , k
′), (5)
pG,E(k, k
′; i) =
1
Ng
Ng∑
j=1
δ(wji , k)δ(b
j
i , k
′), (6)
2 There is a compromise worth investigating between the fidelity
of the message that an agent tries to convey and its ability to
react to environmental conditions in real time. Exploring this
tradeoff is left for future work. By now, the reaction capabilities
of our bit-guessers will be kept to a minimum.
pGE(i) =
1
Ng
Ng∑
j=1
δ(wji , b
j
i )⇒ (7)
⇒ p¯GE =
1
n
n∑
i=1
pGE(i); (8)
with δ(x, y) being Dirac’s delta. Note that pG(k; i) has a
subtle dependency on the environment (because G may
react to it) and that p¯GE indicates the average probabil-
ity that guesser G successfully transmits a bit through
channel E.
Thanks to these equations we can connect with the
cost and reward functions introduced before. For every
bit that attempts to be transmitted, a cost c is paid. A
reward r = c/α is cashed in only if that bit is successfully
received. α is a parameter that controls the payoff. The
survival function reads:
ρGE(α) = (p¯
G
E − α)r, (9)
and p¯GE can be read from equation 8. As a rule of thumb,
if p¯GE > α the given guesser fares well enough in the
proposed environment.
It is useful to quantify the entropy per bit of the mes-
sages produced by G:
H(G) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
k
pG(k; i)log
(
pG(k; i)
)
, (10)
and the mutual information between the messages and
the environment:
I(G : E) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
k,k′
pG,E(k, k
′; i)×
log
(
pG,E(k, k
′; i)
pG(k; i)pE(k′; i)
)
. (11)
To evaluate the performance of a guesser over an en-
semble Eˆm of environments (instead of over single envi-
ronments) we attempt Ng broadcasts over each of Ne dif-
ferent environments (El ∈ Eˆm, l = 1, . . . , Ne ≡ ||Eˆm||)
of a given size. For simplicity, instead of labeling bji,l,
we stack together all Ng × Ne n-sized words W j and
Bj . This way bji ∈ Bj and wji ∈ W j for i = 1, . . . , n
and j = 1, . . . , NgNe. We have p
G(k; i), pEˆm(k
′; i),
pG,Eˆm(k, k
′; i), pG
Eˆm
(i), and p¯G
Eˆm
defined just as in equa-
tions 5-8, only with j running through j = 1, . . . , NgNe.
Also as before, we average the payoff across environments
to determine whether a guesser’s messages get success-
fully transmitted or not given α and the length m of the
environments in the ensemble:
ρG
Eˆm
(α) = (p¯G
Eˆm
− α)r. (12)
Note that
I(G : Eˆm) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
∑
k,k′
pG,Eˆm(k, k
′; i)×
5FIG. 3 From a generative model to inference about the
world. A diagrammatic representation of the algorithmic
logic of the bit guessing machine. Our n-guesser contains
a generative model (represented by a pool of words) from
which it draws guesses about the environment. If a bit is
successfully inferred, the chosen conjecture is pursued further
by comparing a new bit. Otherwise, the inference is reset.
log
(
pG,Eˆm(k, k
′; i)
pG(k; i)pEˆm(k
′; i)
)
(13)
is different from
〈I(G : E)〉Eˆm =
1
Ne
Ne∑
l=1
I(G : El). (14)
We use 〈·〉Eˆm to indicate averages across environments
of an ensemble Eˆm.
Finally, we discuss the generative models at the core
of our bit-guessers. These are mechanisms that produce
n-sized strings of bits, partly as a reaction to contingen-
cies of the environment. Such message-generating pro-
cesses ΓG could be implemented in different ways, includ-
ing Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) (Hopfield, 1988),
spiking neurons (Maass & Bishop, 2001), Bayesian net-
works (Jensen, 1996; Pearl, 1985), Turing machines (Tur-
ing, 1936), Markovian chains (Markov, 1971), -machines
(Crutchfield & Young, 1989), Random Boolean Networks
(RBNs) (Kauffman, 1993), among others. These devices
elaborate their guesses through a series of algorithms
(e.g. back-propagation, message passing, or Hebbian
learning) provided they have access to a sample of their
environment.
In the real world, trial and error and evolution through
natural selection would be the algorithm wiring the ΓG
(or, in a more biological language, a genotype) into our
agents. The dynamics of such evolutionary process are
very interesting. However, in this paper we aim at un-
derstanding the limits imposed by a channel’s complexity
and the cost of inference, not the dynamics of how those
limits may be reached. Therefore, we assume that our
agents perform an almost perfect inference given the en-
vironment where they live. This best inference will be
hard-wired in the guesser’s generative model ΓG as ex-
plained right ahead.
A guesser’s generative model usually depends on the
environment where it is deployed, so we note ΓG ≡ ΓGE .
This ΓGE will consist of a pool of bits gi ∈ ΓGE (figure
3) and a series of rules dictating how to emit those bits:
either in a predetermined order or as a response to the
channel’s changing conditions. Whenever we pick up an
environment E = {ei, i = 1, . . . ,m}, the best first guess
possible will be the bit (0 or 1) that shows up with more
frequency. Hence:
ΓGE(1) ≡ g1 = max
k′
{pE(k′; 1)} ; (15)
If both 0 and 1 appear equally often we choose 1 without
loss of generality. If the agent succeeds in its first guess,
its safest next bet is to emit the bit (0 or 1) that more
frequently follows g1 in the environment. We proceed
similarly if the first two bits have been correctly guessed,
if the first three bits have been correctly guessed, etc. We
define pB|Γ(k; i) as the probability of finding k = {0, 1}
at the i-th position of the Bj word extracted from the
environment, provided that the guess so far is correct:
pB|Γ(k′; i) =
1
Z(i)
m∑
j=1
δ(bji , k
′)
i−1∏
i′=1
δ(bji′ , gi′). (16)
The index j, in this case, labels all n-sized words within
the environment (bji ∈ Bj) ⊂ E and Z(i) is a normal-
ization constant that depends on how many words in the
environment match ΓGE up to the (i− 1)th bit:
Z(i) =
m∑
j=1
i−1∏
i′=1
δ(bji′ , gi′). (17)
It follows:
ΓGE(i = 2, . . . , n) ≡ gi = max
k′
{
pB|Γ(k′; i)
}
. (18)
Note that the pool of bits in ΓGE consists of an n-sized
word, which is what they try to emit through (i.e. it
constitutes the guess about) the channel. If a guesser
would not be able to react to environmental conditions,
the word W that is actually generated at every emission
would be the same in every case and wji = gi always; but
we allow our guessers a minimal reaction if one of the
bits fails to get through (i.e. if one of the guesses is not
correct). This minimal reaction capacity by our guessers
results in:
wji = Γ
G
E(i− l) = gi−l, (19)
where l is the largest i at which wji 6= bji . This means
that a guesser restarts the broadcast of ΓGE whenever it
6makes a mistake3.
All together, our guesser consists of a generative
model ΓG that contains a pool of bits and a simple
conditional instruction. This is reflected in the flow
chart in figure 3.
We have made a series of choices regarding how to im-
plement environmental conditions. These choices affect
how some randomness enters the model (reflected in the
fact that, given an environment E, a guesser might come
across different words Bj ⊂ E) and also how we im-
plement our guessers (including their minimal adaptabil-
ity to wrong guesses). We came up with a scheme that
codes guessers, environments (or channels), and messages
as bit strings. This allows us a direct measurement of
information-theoretical features which are suitable for
our discussion, but the conclusions at which we arrive
should be general. Survival will depend on an agent’s
ability to embody meaningful information about its en-
vironment. This will ultimately be controlled by the un-
derlying cost-efficiency tradeoff.
Because of the minimal implementation discussed, all
bit-guessers of the same size are equal. Environmental
ensembles of a given size are considered equivalent as
well. Hence, the notation is not affected if we identify
guessers and environments by their sizes. Accordingly,
in the following we substitute the labels G and E by
the more informative ones n and m respectively. Hence
ρGEm(α) becomes ρ
n
m(α), p¯
G
E becomes p¯
n
m, etc.
III. RESULTS
The question that motivates this paper relates to the
tradeoff between fast replication versus the cost of com-
plex inference mechanisms. To tackle this we report a
series of numerical experiments. Some of them deal with
guessers in environment ensembles of fixed size, others al-
low guessers to switch between environment sizes to find
a place where to thrive.
Our core finding is that the complexity of the guessers
that can populate a given environment is determined by
the complexity of the later. (In information theoretical
terms, the complexity of the most efficiently replicated
message follows from the predictability of the channel.)
Back to the fast replication vs complexity question, we
find environments for which simple guessers die off, but
in which more complex life flourishes – thus offering a
quantifiable model for real-life excursions in biological
3 Note that more elaborated guessers would not only reset their
guess. They might browse through a tree with conditional in-
structions at every point. Besides an extended memory to store
the growing number of branches, they would also require nested
if-else instructions. On the other hand, ANNs or Bayesian net-
works might implement such tree-browsing without excessive if-
else costs.
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FIG. 4 Probability of correctly guessing a bit in envi-
ronment ensembles of constant size. p¯nm, average prob-
ability that n-guessers correctly guess 1 bit inm-environments
for different n values. Here p¯1m can be computed analytically
(solid line in the main plot) and marks an average, lower pre-
dictability boundary for all guessers. In the inset, the data
has been smoothed and compared to a given value of α (repre-
sented by a horizontal line). At the intersection between this
line and p¯nm we find m¯
n(α), the environment size at which
n-sized agents guess just enough bits to survive given α. No-
tice that n-guessers are evaluated only in environments of size
m ≥ n.
complexity.
Besides verifying mathematically that the conditions
for complex life exist, out model allows us to explore and
quantify when and how guessers may be pushed to m-
environments of one size or another. We expect to use
this model to investigate this question in future papers.
As neat examples, at the end of this paper we report
i) the evolutionary dynamics established when guessers
are forced to compete with each other, and ii) how the
fast replication vs complexity tradeoff is altered when
resources can be exhausted. These are two possible evo-
lutionary drivers of complex life, as our numerical exper-
iments show.
A. Numerical limits of guesser complexity
Figure 4 shows p¯nm, the average probability that n-
guessers correctly guess 1 bit in m-environments. The 1-
guesser (that lives off maximally decorrelated bits given
the environment) establishes a lower bound. More com-
plex machines will guess more bits on average, except
for infinite environment size m → ∞, at which point all
guessers have equivalent predictive power.
As m grows, environments get less and less predictable.
Importantly, the predictability of shorter words decays
faster than that of larger ones, thus enabling guessers
with larger n to survive where others would perish. There
are 2n possible n-words, of which m are realized in each
m-environment. When m >> 2n, the environment im-
7plements an efficient, ergodic sampling of all n-words
– thus making them maximally unpredictable. When
n <∼ m < 2n the sampling of n-sized words is far from
ergodic and a non-trivial structure is induced in the envi-
ronment because the symmetry between n-sized words is
broken – they cannot be equally represented due to finite
size sampling effects.
This allows that complex guessers (those with the abil-
ity to contemplate larger words, keep them in memory,
and make choices regarding information encoded in larger
strings) can guess more bits, on average, than simpler
agents. In terms of messages crossing the channel, while
shorter words are meaningless and basically get transmit-
ted (i.e. are correctly guessed) by chance alone, larger
words might contain meaningful, non-trivial information
that get successfully transmitted because they cope with
the environment in an adequate way.
Note that this symmetry breaking to favor predictabil-
ity of larger words is just a mechanism that allows us
to introduce correlations in a controlled and measurable
way. In the real world this mechanism might correspond
to asymmetries between dynamical systems in temporal
or spatial scales. Although our implementation is rather
ad hoc (suitable to our computational and conceptual
needs), we propose that similar mechanisms might
play important roles in shaping life and endowing the
universe with meaningful information. Indeed, it might
be extremely rare to find a kind of environment in which
words of all sizes become non-informative simultaneously.
The mutual information between a guesser’s response
and the environment (i.e. between broadcast messages
and channel conditions) further characterizes the advan-
tages of more complex replicators. Figure 5a shows
I(G : Em) and 〈I(G : E)〉Em . As we noted above, these
quantities are not the same. Let us focus on 1-guessers
for a moment to clarify what these quantities encode.
Given an m-environment, 1-guessers have got just one
bit that they try to emit repeatedly. They do not react
to the environment – there is not room for any reaction
within one bit, so their guess is persistently the same.
The mutual information between the emitted bit and the
arbitrary words B ⊂ E that 1-guessers come across is
precisely zero, as shown in the inset of figure 5a. Hence,
〈I(G : E)〉Em captures the mutual information due to the
slight reaction capabilities of guessers to the environmen-
tal conditions.
While the bits emitted by 1-guessers do not corre-
late with B ⊂ E, they do correlate with each given E
since they represent the most frequent bit in the envi-
ronment. Accordingly, the mutual information between
a 1-guesser and the aggregated environments (reflected
by I(G : Em)) is different from zero (figure 5a). To
this quantity contribute both the reaction capability of
guessers and the fact that they have hard-wired a near-
optimal guess in ΓGE , as explained in section II.A.
We take the size of a guesser n as a crude characteri-
zation of its complexity. This is justified because larger
guessers can store more complex patterns. 〈H(G)〉Em
indicates that more complex guessers look more entropic
than less complex ones (figure 5b). Larger guessers
come closer to the entropy level of the environment
(black thick line in figure 5b), which itself tends rapidly
to log(2) per bit. Better performing guessers appear
more disordered to an external observer even if they are
better predictors when considered within their context.
Note that 〈H(G)〉Em is built based on the bits actually
emitted by the guessers. In biological terms, this would
mean that this quantity correlates with the complexity
of the phenotype. For guessers of fixed size n, we observe
a slight decay of 〈H(G)〉Em as we proceed to larger
environments.
The key question is whether the payoff may be favor-
able for more complex guessers provided that they need a
more costly machinery in order to get successfully repro-
duced. As discussed above, if we would use, e.g., Ar-
tificial Neural Networks or Bayesian Inference Graphs
to model our guessers, a cost could be introduced for
the number of units, nodes, or hidden variables. These
questions might be worth studying somewhere else. Here
we are interested in the mathematical existence of such
favorable tradeoff for more complex life. To keep the
discussion simple bit guessers incur only in a cost pro-
portional to the number of bits that they try to trans-
mit. Note that we do not lose generality because such
limit cost shall always exist. Equation 12 captures all
the forces involved: the cost of transmitting longer mes-
sages versus the reward of a successful transmission.
Guessers of a given size survive in an environment en-
semble if, on average, they can guess enough bits of the
environment or, using the information theory picture, if
they can convey enough bits through the channel (in any
case, they survive if p¯nm > α, which implies ρ
n
m > 0). Set-
ting fix a value of α we find out graphically m¯n(α), the
largest environment at which n-guessers survive (figure
4, inset). Because m-environments look more predictable
to more complex guessers we have that m¯n(α) > m¯n
′
(α)
if n > n′. This guarantees that for α > 0.5 there always
exist m-environments from which simple life is banned
while more complex life can thrive – i.e. situations in
which environmental complexity is an explicit driver to-
wards more complex life forms.
This is the result that we sought. The current model
allows us to illustrate mathematically that limit con-
ditions exist under which more complex and costly in-
ference abilities can overcome the pressure for fast and
cheaper replication. Also, the model allows for explicit,
information theoretically-based quantification of such a
limit.
B. Evolutionary drivers
Despite its laborious mathematical formulation, we
think that our bit-guesser model is very simple and ver-
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FIG. 5 Mutual information and entropy. Guessers with
n = 1 (crosses), n = 2 (squares), n = 5 (pluses), and n = 10
(triangles) are presented. a I(G : Em) and 〈I(G : E)〉Em (in-
set) quantify the different sources of information that allow
more complex guessers to thrive in environments in which
simpler life is not possible. b The entropy of a guesser’s mes-
sage given its environment seems roughly constant in these
experiments despite the growing environment size. This sug-
gests an intrinsic measure of complexity for guessers. Larger
guessers look more random even if they might carry more
meaningful information about their environment. The thick
black line represents the average entropy of the environments
(which approaches log(2)) against which the entropy of the
guessers can be compared.
satile. We think that it can easily capture fundamental
information-theoretical aspects of biological systems.
In future papers we intend to use it to further explore
relationships between guessers and environments, within
ecological communities, or in more simple symbiotic or
parasitic situations. To illustrate how this could work
out we present now some minimal examples.
Let us first explore some dynamics in which guessers
are encouraged to explore more complex environments,
but this same complexity can become a burden. As be-
fore, let us evaluate an n-guesser Ng ·Ne times in a sam-
ple of the m-environment ensemble. Let us also look at
ρˆnm(α,Ng, Ne), the accumulated reward after theseNg·Ne
evaluations – note that ρˆnm is an empirical random vari-
able now. If ρˆnm(α,Ng, Ne) > 0, the n-guesser fares well
enough in this m-environment and it is encouraged to ex-
plore a more complex one. As a consequence, the guesser
is promoted to an (m+1)-environment, where it is evalu-
ated again. If ρˆnm(α,Ng, Ne) < 0, this m-environment is
excessively challenging for this n-guesser, and it is de-
moted to an (m − 1)-environment. Note that the n-
guesser itself remains with a fixed size throughout. It
is the complexity of the environment that changes de-
pending on the reward accumulated.
As we repeatedly evaluate the n-guesser, some dynam-
ics are established which let the guesser explore more or
less complex environments. The steady state of these dy-
namics is characterized by a distribution Pn(m,α). This
tells us the frequency with which n-guessers are found in
environments of a given size (figure 6a). Each n-guesser
has its own distribution that captures the environmen-
tal complexity that the guesser deals more comfortably
with. The overlaps and gaps between Pn(m,α) for dif-
ferent n suggest that: i) some guessers would engage in
harsh competition if they needed to share environments
of a given kind and ii) there is room for different guessers
to get segregated into environments of increasing com-
plexity.
The average
mˆn(α) =
∑
m
mPn(m,α) (20)
should converge to mˆn(α) ' m¯n(α) under the appropri-
ate limit. This is, if we evaluate the guessers numerically
enough times, the empirical value mˆn(α) should converge
to the mean field value m¯n(α) shown in the inset of
figure 4. Figure 6b shows dynamically-derived averages
mˆn(α) and some deviations around them as a function
of α.
It is easily justified that guessers drop to simpler en-
vironments if they cannot cope with a large complexity.
It is less clear why they should seek more complicated
environments if they thrive in a given one. This might
happen if some external force drives them. For example
if simpler guessers (which might be more efficient in sim-
pler environments) have already crowded the place. Let
us remind, from figure 4, how given an environment size
more complex guessers can always accumulate a larger re-
ward. This might suggest that complex guessers always
pay off, but the additional complexity might become a
burden in energetic terms – consider, e.g., the exagger-
ated metabolic cost of mammal brains. It is non-trivial
how competition dynamics between guessers of different
size can play out. Let us gain some insights by looking
at a simple model.
n-guessers with n = 0, 1, 2, 3, and 4 were randomly
distributed occupying 100 environments, all of them with
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FIG. 6 Dynamics around m¯n(α). Again, guessers with
n = 1 (solid line), n = 2 (dashed line), n = 5 (dotted line),
and n = 10 (dot-dashed line). a Pn(m,α) tells us how often
do we find n-guessers in m-environments when they are al-
lowed to roam constrained only by their survival function ρnm.
The central value mˆn of Pn(m,α) must converge to m¯n(α)
and oscillations around it depend (through Ng and Ne) on
how often do we evaluate the guessers in each environment.
b Average mˆn for n = 1, 2, 5, 10 and standard deviation of
Pn(m,α) for n = 1, 10. Deviations are not presented for
n = 2, 5 for clarity. The inset represents a zoom in into the
main plot.
fixed size m. These guessers were assigned an initial
ρˆi(t = 0) = nρ0. Here, i = 1, . . . , 100 labels each one
of the 100 available guessers. Larger guessers start out
with larger ρˆi(t = 0) representing that they come into
being with a larger metabolic load satisfied. A 0-guesser
represents an unoccupied environment. New empty en-
vironments might appear only if actual (n 6= 0) guessers
die, as we explain below. We tracked the population
using Pm(n, t), the proportion of 0-, 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-
guessers through time4.
At each iteration, a guesser (say the i-th one) was
chosen randomly and evaluated with respect to its en-
vironment. Then the wasted environment was replaced
by a new, random one with the same size. We ensured
that every guesser attempts to guess the same amount
of bits on average. This means, e.g., that 1-guessers are
tested twice as often as 2-guessers, etc. If after the eval-
uation we found that ρˆi(t + ∆t) < 0, then the guesser
died and it was substituted by a new one. The n of the
new guesser was chosen randomly after the current dis-
tribution Pm(n, t). If ρˆi(t+ ∆t) > 2nρ0, the guesser got
replicated and shared its ρˆi with its daughter, who over-
rode another randomly chosen guesser. This replication
at 2nρ0 represents that, before creating a similar agent,
parents must satisfy a metabolic load that grows with
their size. There is a range (0 < ρˆi < 2nρ0) within which
guessers are alive but do not replicate.
Of course, this minimal model is just a proxy and softer
constraints could be placed. These could allow, e.g., for
random replication depending on the accumulated ρˆi(t+
∆t), or for larger progeny if ρˆi(t + ∆t) >> 2nρ0. These
are interesting variations that might be worth exploring.
There are also some insights to be gained from the simple
setup considered here. We expect that more complex
models will largely inherit the exploratory results that
follow.
Figure 7a and b show Pm(n, t = 10 000) with α = 0.6
and 0.65. Note that for large environments all guessers
combined do not add up to 100. Indeed, they fall short
from that number – i.e. mostly empty slots remain. The
most abundant guesser after 10000 iterations is shown in
figure 7c as a function of m and α.
These plots show how guessers naturally segregate in
environments depending on their complexity, with sim-
pler guessers crowding simpler environments as suggested
above. In such simple environments, the extra reward
earned by more complex guessers does not suffice to over-
come their energetic cost and they lost in this direct com-
petition. They are, hence, pushed to more complex en-
vironments where their costly inference machinery pays
off.
After 10 000 iterations we also observe cases in which
different guessers coexist. This means that the mathe-
matical limits imposed by this naive model do not imply
an immediate, absolute dominance of the fittest guesser.
Interesting temporal dynamics might arise and offer the
possibility to model complex ecological interactions.
So far our guessers only interacted with the environ-
ment in a passive way, by receiving the reward that the
4 These experiments were the more computationally demanding,
that is why we took n = 1, 2, 3, 4 instead of the values n =
1, 2, 5, 10 used throughout the paper. The insights gained from
the simulations do not depend on the actual values of n.
10
Envinronment size (m) Envinronment size (m)
a b
0
25
50
75
100
0 15 30
c d
Envinronment size (m) Envinronment size (m)
0 15 30 10 20 30 40
0.6
0.625
0.65
0.675
0.7
10 20 30 40
0.5
0.625
0.75
0.875
1
FIG. 7 Evolutionary drivers: competition. Coexisting replicators will affect each other’s environments in non-trivial
ways which may often result in competition. We implement a dynamics in which 1-, 2-, 3-, and 4-guessers exclusively occupy a
finite number of environments of a given size (fixed m). The 100 available slots are randomly occupied at t = 0 and granted to
the best replicators as the dynamics proceed. We show Pm(n, t = 10 000) for m = 5, . . . , 39 and α = 0.6 (a), α = 0.65 (b). The
most abundant guesser at t = 10000 is shown for α ∈ (0.5, 1) (c) and α ∈ (0.6, 0.7) (d). Once m is fixed, there is an upper value
of α above which no guesser survives and all 100 available slots remain empty. Competition and the replication-predictability
tradeoff segregate guessers according to the complexity of the environment – i.e. of the transmission channel. Coexistence of
different guessers seems possible (e.g. m = 15 in b), but it cannot be guaranteed that the dynamics have converged to a steady
distribution.
corresponding m-environment dictates. But living sys-
tems also shape their niche in return. Such interplay can
become very complicated and we think that our model
offers a powerful exploratory tool. Let us study a very
simple case in which the actions of the guessers (i.e. their
correctly guessing a bit or not) affect the reward that an
environment can offer.
To do so we rethink the bits in an environment as re-
sources that can be exhausted if correctly guessed, but
also replenished after enough time has elapsed. Alterna-
tively, thinking from the message broadcasting perspec-
tive, a spot on the channel might appear crowded if it
is engaged in a successful transmission. Assume that ev-
ery time that a bit is correctly guessed it gets exhausted
(or gets crowded) with an efficiency β so that on average
each bit cannot contribute any reward β(p¯nm/m) of the
time. The average reward extracted by a guesser from
an ensemble becomes:
r˜nm =
(
1− β p¯
n
m
m
)
p¯nmr, (21)
which is plotted for 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-guessers and β = 1
in figure 8.
Smaller guessers living in very small environments
quickly crowd their channels (alternatively, exhaust the
resources they depend on). In figure 8b (still with β = 1)
given some α, 1- and 2-guessers can only survive within
some under and upper limits (figure 8b). Furthermore,
the slope of the curves around these limits also tell us
important information. If these guessers dwell in envi-
ronments around the lower limit (i.e. near the small-
est m-environment where they can persist), then moving
to larger environments will always report larger rewards.
But if they dwell close to the upper limit, moving to
larger environments will always be detrimental. In other
words, dynamics such as the one introduced at the begin-
ning of this section (illustrated in figure 6a) would have
respectively unstable and stable fixed points in the upper
and lower limits of persistence.
This simple model illustrates how scarcity of resources
(and, more general, other kinds of guesser-environment
interactions) might play an important role as evolution-
ary drivers towards more complex life. This does not
intend to be an exhaustive nor a definitive model, just
an illustration of the versatility of the bit-guessers and
environments introduced in this paper.
IV. DISCUSSION
In this paper we have considered a fundamental ques-
tion related to the emergence of complexity in living sys-
tems. The problem being addressed here is whether the
mathematical conditions exist such that mode complex
organisms can overcome the cost of their complexity by
developing a higher potential to predict the external envi-
ronment. As suggested by several authors (Friston, 2013;
Jacob, 1998; Wagensberg, 2000) the behavioral plasticity
provided by the exploratory behavior of living systems
can be understood it terms of their potential for dealing
with environmental information (Gerhart and Kirschner,
1997).
Our models make an explicit approach by considering a
replication-predictability tradeoff under very general as-
sumptions, namely: i) More complex environments look
more unpredictable to simpler replicators and ii) Agents
that can keep a larger memory and make inferences based
on more elaborated information can extract enough valu-
able bits from the environment as to survive in those
more challenging situations. Despite the inevitable cost
inherent to the cognitive machinery, a selection process
towards more complex life is shown to exist. This paves
11
0 10 20 30
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0 10 20 30
Envinronment size (m)
0.55
0.57
0.59
0.61
a
b
FIG. 8 Evolutionary drivers: exhausted resources.
Rather than monopolizing channel slots (as in figure 5), we
can also conceive individual bits as valuable, finite resources
that get exhausted whenever they are correctly guessed. Then
a successful replicator can spoil its own environment and new
conditions might apply to where life is possible. a Average
reward obtained by 1-, 2-, 5-, and 10-guessers in environments
of different sizes when bits get exhausted with efficiency β = 1
whenever they are correctly guessed. b Given α = 0.575 and
α = 0.59, 1- and 2-guessers can survive within upper and
lower environment sizes. If the environment is too small, re-
sources get consumed quickly and cannot sustain the replica-
tors. In message transmission language, the guessers crowd
their own channel. If the environment is too large, unpre-
dictability takes over for these simple replicators and they
perish.
the way for explicit evolutionary pressures towards more
complex life forms.
In our study we identify a transmitter (replicators at a
given generation), a receiver (replicators at the next gen-
eration), and a channel (any environmental conditions)
through which a message (ideally instructions about how
to build newer replicators) is passed on. Darwinian evo-
lution follows naturally as effective replicators transit a
channel faster and more reliably thus getting more and
more space in successive generations. The inference task
is implicit as the environment itself codes for meaningful
bits of information that, if picked up by the replicators,
boost the fitness of the phenotypes embodied by the suc-
cessful messages.
This view is directly inspired by a qualitative ear-
lier picture introduced by Maynard-Smith (2000). That
metaphor assigned to the DNA some external meaning
that had to be preserved against the environmental noise.
Contrary to this, we propose that, as messages attempt
to travel from a generation to the next one, all chan-
nel conditions (including noise) pump relevant bits into
the transmitted strings – hence there is no need to pro-
tect meaning against the channel because, indeed, mean-
ingful information emerges out of the replicator’s inter-
action with such channel contingencies. The way that
we introduce correlations in our scheme (through a sym-
metry breaking between the information borne by short
and larger words due to finite size effects) is compatible
with this view. However, interestingly, it also suggests
that meaningful information might arise naturally even
in highly unstructured environments when different spa-
tial and temporal scales play a relevant role.
This way of integrating information theory and Dar-
winiand evolution is convenient to analyze the questions
at hand that concern the emergence of complex life forms.
But it also suggests further research lines. As discussed
at the beginning of the paper, guessers and their trans-
missible messages might and should shape the transmis-
sion channel (e.g., by crowding it, as explored briefly
in section III.B). What possible co-evolutionary dynam-
ics between guessers and channels can be established?
Are there stable ones, others leading to extinction, etc?
Do some of them, perhaps, imply open-ended evolution?
Which ones? These are questions that relate tightly
to the phenomenon of niche construction. We propose
that they can be easily modeled within the proposed bit-
guesser paradigm. Further exploring the versatility of the
model, a guesser’s transmitted message might be consid-
ered an environment in itself; thus opening the door to
ecosystem modeling based on bare information theory.
It is also suggested the exploration of different symbiotic
relationships from this perspective and how they might
affect coevolution.
Finally, an important question was left aside that con-
cerns the memory vs adaptability tradeoff of bit guessers.
Here we studied guessers with a minimal adaptability to
focus on the emerging hierarchy of complexity. Adapt-
ability at faster (say, at behavioral) temporal scales is
linked to more complex inferences with richer dynamics.
This brings in new dilemmas as to how to weight the
different building blocks of complex inference – e.g. how
do we compare memory and if-else or while instructions?
These and other questions are left for exploration in fu-
ture research.
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